Do embedded textual cues in asynchronous communication affect deceptive message detection? The expanded use of social media and rich media applications in business make this an important issue. Prior research indicates deception commonly occurs in all forms of communication and people have difficulty detecting its use. Asynchronous online communications are no exception and offer users a variety of media choices which may complicate deception detection, particularly if the sender has strategically selected a channel intended to disguise their intentions. The current study investigated whether embedded, non-verbal cues in common media forms found in asynchronous online venues influenced deception detection. Drawing on media synchronicity theory, results suggest embedding non-verbal cues in the form of annotated text can enhance deception detection. Overall, the findings suggest managers must be wary of sender motivations, which can influence message veracity, particularly in low synchronicity environments where media is subject to edits and manipulations.
Text dominates much of the asynchronous communication space with typical applications such as email, text messages, Twitter, Facebook, message forums, and so forth. In text, many, but not all, subtle cues often are not present. For instance, many cues about status, position, and situational norms are missing . Other nonverbal cues that often accompany face-to-face communication also may be missing. Among these are speech tempo, hand gestures, expressions, volume changes, emotional signals, body language, eye motions, and others. Some text communication may attempt to replace non-verbal cues with emoticons or 'out-of-proportional' emphasis on particular words or phrase, or the use of capitalization, font changes, or color patterns. Flaming "refers to a message sender's hostile emotional expressions characterized by using insulting, profane, or offensive language" (Cho & Kwon, 2015, p. 364) . The practice of flaming, although overtly hostile, may also be incorporated into banter that provides an emotional outlet in a less rich media environment (Alonzo & Aiken, 2004) . While MST suggests asynchronous text may not be able to transmit the cues that audio and video carry, some research may suggest otherwise. Lea and Spears (1992) conducted an early study into paralanguage use in text formats (e.g. grunts, pseudo-words like 'umm' and so forth). Their findings suggest paralanguage cues signify socially shared meanings and this could result in more cues being transmitted.
The use of audio messages in asynchronous communication permits the addition of several cues that are not present in text messages. Among these are speech tempo, voice inflections, volume changes, some emotional signals, starts and stops, and other vocalizations. Audio should provide the capability of adding more non-verbal cues and hence be a richer media source than text or even text with emoticons and characteristics found in flaming. In addition, audio messages can be modified through word emphasis, handclaps, and other noises that affect the receiver's perceptions.
Finally, asynchronous video messages convey a wider set of non-verbal cues. Among these would be cues about status, position, and situational norms . Additionally, other nonverbal cues, such as those made possible with audio, may be included. In general, video provides capabilities more closely approximating face-to-face 8 communication. This feature has been called symbol variety, which increases as the number of differing cues and language elements that a medium can simultaneously communicate . Video contains several visual cues that enrich symbol variety when compared to audio or text. In asynchronous environments, feedback and adjustments due to interaction would not be present.
Deception Detection
Prior researchers have defined deception in communication as "a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver" (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 205) . This definition includes several key elements. First, deception is intentional. Second, it aims to mislead or create a false perception in a recipient. Third, the definition excludes honest mistakes and non-intentional deceptive behaviors. Deception research often is structured around the specific exchange of information between deceivers (senders) and recipients (targets); and the perceptions of those observing the exchange (Burgoon, Buller, Floyd, & Grandpre, 1996) . Additionally, past research suggests deception occurs frequently in everyday communication and other venues (George & Robb, 2008; Ott et al., 2012) . In fact, some researchers suggest deception is inherent in human behavior and is rooted in biological processes (Ekman, 2006) , although others have challenged this assertion (Serota, Levine, & Boster, 2010) .
As might be expected, past research focuses on deceptive behaviors, motivations for engaging in deception, and the ways to enhance successful deceptive detection. One such body of research concentrates on how deceptive communication contrasts with honest communication. Examples include that liars are less forthcoming and tell less compelling stories than truth tellers; and that deceivers tend to make a more negative impression and often are more tense (DePaulo et al., 2003) . Deceptive communication often takes longer to formulate and is prone to inconsistencies according to Walczyk et al. (2009) . Other research suggests people who attempt to deceive may exhibit indicators. Among these are increased blinking, voice pitch change, passive statement use, an increase of personal grooming, sneers, smiles, negative statement use, nervousness, tenseness, and others (DePaulo et al., 2003) .
Other research suggests that these cues may not be readily visible. For instance, DePaulo et al. (2003) report that telling a lie will not automatically affect behavior, and therefore, easily discernable physical responses such as 'Pinocchio's growing nose' do not exist. Neuroscience research supports this view. Sip et al. (2013) in their study, 'When Pinocchio's Nose does not Grow,' state "activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off." (n.p.) Sip et al. (2013) tie exhibition of physical cues to brain regions associated "with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval." (n.p.) This means deceptive behavior is context dependent and is manifested not due to the lie but rather because the liar believes their deception can be detected. This creates a "cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections" (Sip et al., 2013, n.p.) .
Using similar logic, Vrij (2000) suggests particular responses are likely to occur during deception because deceivers often experience three processes while lying. Vrij calls these processes emotional, content complexity and attempted behavioral control or impression management. According to Vrij each of these processes may influence the sender and manifest as detectable cues or behaviors. Or as Vrij et al. (2000) suggest in related work: a liar's behavior, voice or speech might be affected not because the person lies but because, for example, s/he experiences certain emotions when s/he is lying.
An alternate but similar view is provided by Ekman (2009) . In his book, Telling lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace, politics, and marriage, Ekman suggests telling a lie is likely to evoke one of three different emotions: fear, guilt, or duping delight. Ekman provides a variety of circumstances that may trigger each of these emotions and then states, "Guilt, fear, delight, all can be shown in facial expression, the voice, or body movement, even when the liar is trying to conceal them. Even if there is no nonverbal leakage, the struggle to prevent it may produce a deception clue" (Ekman, 2009, p. 79) . Other research suggests cues may emerge from deceptive communication because liars find it difficult to think of plausible stories, avoid contradictions, maintain consistency within the lie, and determine what portions of a fabrication might be discovered as false by an observer---all while avoiding a slip of the tongue. And, the lies have to be carefully committed to memory so the stories can be exactly recounted if necessary and to ensure future communications remain consistent (Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995) . Burgoon et al. (1995) further report that as sender social skills increase, believability increases and receiver deception detection accuracy decreases. Vrij and Mann (2004) suggest those seeking to detect deception can benefit from reviewing a combination of behavioral, auditory and speech content in a systematic way to uncover cues. Behavioral researchers suggest that a variety of factors influence deception detection since neither liars nor truth-tellers respond identically to the same situations. Behavior for both sender and receiver depends on their current emotional state (Ekman & Friesen, 1969) , the complexity of the communication, and the need to control the impression made on others (Vrij, 2000; Vrij & Mann, 2004) . This means initiating a deception is complex for a variety of reasons. It places cognitive demands on the sender in the form of conjectures about his or her pre-existing knowledge, size of gap between message and truth, chances of getting caught, and so forth. Therefore, deceptive behaviors are emotionally taxing and may cause anxiety and other signs of physiological arousal that require effortful self-regulation (Abe, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh, & Fujii, 2007; Sip et al., 2013) .
These signs of physiological arousal result in what researchers call leakage (Ekman & Friesen, 1969) . Leakage theory suggests deceivers may attempt to hide deception by mimicking honest communication. This emotionally taxing form of impression management places many demands on the deceiver. For instance, the words of the message must be controlled, body language monitored and regulated, voice tone and speed regulated and so forth to the point where control fails and cues to deception leak out (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; George, Carlson, & Valacich, 2013) .
Prior research efforts demonstrate deception is widespread and yet receivers have difficulty identifying deceptive messages (Hancock, 2007) . Bond and DePaulo (2006) report most people, including those expected to be well-qualified at recognizing truthfulness, such as police officers and judges, generally perform only slightly better than random chance (Bond & Depaulo, 2008) . Research suggests every medium is capable of use for deceptive communication. Further, research suggests deception can be detected in all media such that "a written statement may not have nonverbal cues, but inconsistencies in a written narration will reveal deception" (Rao & Lim, 2000, p. 6 ). This statement subtly reveals a dilemma that affects deception detection in various media forms and as a result, research indicates the potential for contradictory expectations in deception detection. A strategically dishonest sender may use knowledge of known deception indicators to create an illusion which is more difficult to detect (George et al., 2013; Tsikerdekis & Zeadally, 2014a , 2015 .
Deception in Online Asynchronous Venues
Deception may arise from a variety of motivations, and some of these are unique to online or other asynchronous environments. For this reason, researchers specifically study deceptive behaviors in online venues and offer insights. For example, a study of 257 Israeli respondents indicated reasons for deceptive behavior included: privacy concerns, identity play, elevating status, and attractiveness (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006) . Caspi and Gorsky (2006) report that "[c]ontrary to face-to-face deception, online deception seems to be an enjoyable activity." (p. 58) This is supported by Ekman's concept of duping delight (Ekman, 2009, pp. 76-79) . Similarly, a recent global study of 461 Internet users from France, the U.S., India, and South Korea found that individuals are more likely to lie online than face-to-face (Marett, George, Lewis, Gupta, & Giordano, 2017) . Caspi and Gorsky (2006) further suggest, "[n]egative emotions, like guilt, shame and fear generally associated with face-to-face deception appear to be lacking in online deception. Very few participants reported negative feelings such as stress or tension" (p. 58). This research validates Crowell et al.'s (2005) premise that computermediated communication causes a form of altered ethical sensitivity and that digital objects are not perceived as real objects. This leads to people judging online interaction differently (Crowell et al., 2005) and may enable an individual
Hypotheses
Consistent with MST from a receiver's standpoint, we believe that asynchronous, text-based media have the potential to reveal varying numbers of cues, to those attempting to detect deception. Prior studies have examined deception detection from a variety of perspectives. While much research has focused on MST, and how media synchronicity and its components influence deception detection through the production and notice of various cues, other research has considered asynchronous communications from conceptual and applied perspectives. For instance, researchers investigated motivations for using various media for deception from a strategic perspective (George et al., 2013) . Others have suggested theoretical models to explain media's role in the creation and detection of deception . Still other examples provide insight into deceptive approaches in CMC , modality effect on deception detection (Zhou & Zhang, 2007) , and motivations (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006) . However, most empirical deception detection of media snippets similar to material posted on social media platforms largely has focused on synchronous approaches to communication (Gupta, 2015; Lewis, 2009; McHaney et al., 2015) or having experimental access to the deceivers. Existing asynchronous studies primarily focused on text-based detection (George, Marett, & Tilley, 2004; Zhou & Zhang, 2007) . The current research expands the text-based studies into media capable of transmitting more cues and focuses on artifacts specifically related to asynchronous computer-based communication in text-based environments. Consistent with MST from a receiver's standpoint, we believe that some asynchronous media could reveal more leakages and cues than others to those attempting to detect deception. Therefore, to further examine the concepts of leakage, we added cues back into text snippets, creating annotated text snippets. The snippets attempted to include every non-verbal cue found in recorded video snippets which have more capacity for leakage (DePaulo et al., 2003) . Therefore, we believe that annotated text snippets will contain far more cues than are available in regular text snippets. Research into paralanguage (Lea & Spears, 1992) suggests annotated text should provide easier detection than plain text. Our primary hypothesis becomes:
H1: Individuals will be more accurate in deception detection in an asynchronous environment when viewing annotated
In similar fashion, we expect audio snippets to contain fewer cues than the annotated text hence resulting in lower deception detection:
H2: Individuals will be more accurate in deception detection in an asynchronous environment when viewing annotated text snippets than when listening to audio snippets.
A further hypothesis was tested as a control to ensure the cues introduced into the annotated text had a significant impact:
H3: Individuals will be no more accurate in deception detection in an asynchronous environment when viewing plain text snippets than when listening to audio snippets.
Method
In a pre-study phase, a pool of 50 subjects was developed. Researchers screened participants according to job experience, age, and social media use to ensure they had experience in the 'real-world.' Pre-study participants came from campus staff positions, campus classes, online classes, and graduate school. Each participant viewed a random sequence of audio, annotated text, and text snippets. They answered questions about their backgrounds and experience. Based on the results of the pre-study, questions and techniques were fine-tuned to eliminate discrepancies and reduce the potential for misunderstanding.
The primary study commenced in the summer months of 2016 (e.g. July and August) utilizing a sample comprising 850 subjects located in the United States. A Qualtrics panel, developed with the assistance of survey specialists from Qualtrics, with appropriate constraints, ensured a representative respondent group. The respondents received no training, although some research has shown this could improve detection rates (Porter et al., 2000) . Researchers stratified respondents according to age (18-70 years old), gender, and social media usage. People with zero social media experience were screened out of the study. All participants received background information about their task and identical sets of instructions regarding deception detection. All treatments received the same information. The sample was 57% female and 43% male. No interaction nor significant effects due to any collected demographics nor collection period were found. Researchers removed two hundred seven respondents from the data set due to poor quality of responses (e.g. not being consistent on filtering questions) or because they rated all snippets as indeterminate. This left 643 respondents that rated at least one media snippet as deceptive or truthful.
The study comprised independent individual experiments. Participants were shown eight media snippets each. Each snippet was randomly displayed (audio, annotated text, and plain text) and showed job interviewees truthfully or deceptively describing their background. The primary artifact for the source material was audio/video. All other media formats were derivations of the original representation. Camtasia Studio rendered audio/video into a purely audio form. A text transcript, derived manually from the audio/video, was checked for accuracy by several researchers. Finally, annotations regarding physical movements, coughs, yawns, pauses, and other cues were coded into the annotated version of the text file. Multiple researchers checked the result to ensure all noticeable cues faithfully translated into readable form. For example, a yawn was represented as <yawn> and an abnormal pause in speaking was represented as <pause>. Paralanguage utterances such as umm, oh, and hmm were also added to the annotated transcript in a consistent manner (Lea & Spears, 1992) . For example, the following message was annotated as shown to capture cues visible in the audio/video version of the media but not found in the text version:
Text: Absolutely I'll be able to increase it. Once I've enrolled in the school of business my GPA has gone from low all the way up.
Annotated Text: Absolutely I'll be able to increase it <pause>. Once I've enrolled in the school of business my GPA has gone, <small sigh> from low all the way up.
The original source material comprised a series of eight snippets taken from recorded face-to-face interviews, in which individuals answered questions about true or false information they had entered on a scholarship application. The source material was edited so only a narrative provided by the interview was seen/heard. All other material was edited out and removed leaving a contiguous comment. The material was titled and described so survey respondents understood the material's context. Participants were instructed to determine the level of deception used by the snippet's subject. Half of
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McHaney, George, Gupta / Deception Detection -Annotated Text-Based Cues the eight snippets used in this study were honest, and the other half were dishonest. Participants in the interviews were all native speakers of English. Participants viewed each segment and then determined if the subject communicated honestly or deceptively. After each snippet, an embedded survey prompted the individual to record a decision. Time was not constrained, which provided low synchronicity. Individuals assessed the perceived level of deception on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 for 'very honest' to 7 for 'very dishonest.' This procedure was repeated eight times with randomly selected text, annotated text, or audio clips for each participant.
Although participants judged the veracity of the snippets on a 7-point Likert scale, their responses were collapsed to form uniform judgments being either true (a score of 1 to 3 on the scale) or false (a score of 5 to 7). Scores of 4, which indicated indecisiveness, were ignored for our analysis. A total of 3,958 judgments were rated and used for the data analysis. Participant veracity judgments were compared to actual honesty or dishonesty ratings of the snippet, indicating if the participant had been correct or not. This binary variable measured performance of each participant for each snippet viewed. These data were used to test our hypotheses.
Results
We used binary regression with repeated measures to assess the data and determine if deception detection accuracy is impacted by media type. We discovered that an overall significant effect based on media type existed for the four treatments [ꭓ 2 (3, N=3958) = 17.23, p = 0.001]. Since the overall model was significant, a series of subsequent pairwise Bonferroni tests were used to assess H1 through H3.
H1 compared plain text to annotated text. As expected, annotated text yielded higher levels of deception detection than plain text, at p=.003. This was consistent with our expectations. When H2 was tested, comparing annotated text to audio, the results were significant at p=.005. Annotated text snippets resulted in higher levels of deception detection than audio snippets. Also as expected, our control hypothesis, H3, was not significant. This further suggests that annotating text snippets using embedded cues from a video source impacted the respondants' ability to detect deception. The same impact was not found in plain text. 
Discussion
Overall evaluation of the data allowed us to conclude that embedding annotated text cues influenced deception detection accuracy. Significance of H1 and H2 suggested that annotated text resulted in higher levels of deception detection than either audio or plain text. This makes logical sense. For instance, in H1, more cues were embedded in the annotated version of the text, and these were used by receivers to make more accurate judgments. Likewise, H2 indicated deception detection in annotated text was more accurate than in the audio snippets. This result implies that annotating a snippet captured additional cues not present in audio format. For instance, some annotations such as <deep breath> may not have been as noticeable when listening to an audio clip but may have been more noticeable as paralanguage in the annotated text. By annotating the text, the judge's attention specifically was drawn to the non-verbal cue. Other factors also may have come into play. For instance, participants may have read an annotated text snippet multiple times. The judge would not need to take a physical action to 'replay' the annotated text snippet, but the audio snippets would need to be physically restarted to listen to more than once. This finding has implications for use of emoticons and other nonverbal, paralanguage which can be embedded in asynchronous communications and are readily available for reinspection without the need for further action.
As mentioned earlier, another possible explanation for annotated text to enable better deception detection relates to the concept of conveyance (Dennis et al., 2008) . Conveyance essentially is transmission of new information and subsequent McHaney, George, Gupta / Deception Detection -Annotated Text-Based Cues processing by the receiver to create and modify his or her mental model of current communication. Conveyance is positively enhanced by media that are intrinsically low in synchronicity. According to Dennis el al. (2008) , conveyance requires cognitive resources to integrate this information into a mental model, and therefore, lower synchronicity (e.g. asynchronous communication) allows the receiver more time to acquire meaning from the message. Annotated text has very low synchronicity and can be reviewed multiple times, enabling the judge to develop a better mental model of the communication and form an opinion about the presence of deception.
According to the same research, media with higher levels of synchronicity (Dennis et al., 2008) have the capability to transmit a wider variety of both verbal and non-verbal cues. In fact, face-to-face communication, the penultimate example of media exhibiting the highest level of synchronicity, is widely regarded to have all forms of verbal and non-verbal cues available (Rao & Lim, 2000) . Research has indicated that this availability of cues positively influences the accuracy of correctly identifying deception and therefore could be translated into higher deception detection rates (Rao & Lim, 2000) . Additionally, people are more confident making deception judgments media with higher levels of synchronicity Gupta, 2015) .
The current study appears to indicate that asynchronous media, such as annotated text, can carry a variety of verbal and non-verbal cues, and offers additional advantages. Among these are reprocessability or the capacity to store message contents which allows subsequent access, review, and thoughtful analysis of messages , or extensibility, which provides mechanisms for composing messages in a thoughtful way. In asynchronous mode, a receiver would have the capacity to review communication and thoughtfully analyze it in a way that leads to good deception detection judgments. This could have a better result than a rushed judgment that takes place during a synchronous exchange. Like a synchronous exchange, receivers could request more information. A time delay would be inevitable, the length of which may also provide data for deception detection according to social presence theory (Ho et al., 2016) . This may mean that annotated transcripts of crucial communications could be worth generating and examination by decision makers.
On the downside, a sender could rehearse their message, edit and re-record it until the communication sufficiently disguised their true intent (if deception was the goal). Recent research into fake, asynchronous reviews by Zhang et al. (2016, p. 476 ) supports this premise saying, "nonverbal features can be more effective for detecting online fake reviews than verbal features." In other words, the deceptive sender would have the ability to review their communication, identify leakage, and edit the message in way that better hides their deception. This creates the impression of honest communication. According to George et al. (2013 George et al. ( , p. 1236 , "controlling communication in this way makes many demands on the deceiver. The deceiver must control the words of the message, his or her body language, voice pitch, and other paralinguistic aspects of communication." In synchronous communication, this can cause control to break down and allow cues to deception to leak out. In asynchronous communication, the deceiver would have to spend extra time identifying leakage and removing the cues. This aspect of asynchronous communication, called rehearsability, is more readily available than in synchronous communication, because the medium enables the sender to rehearse and finetune a message during encoding, before sending (George et al., 2013) . In some forms of media, the editing process itself may provide clues to deceptive behavior as "a photograph that looks edited" (Tsikerdekis & Zeadally, 2014a , p. 1312 .
From a broad perspective, this study indicated annotating text adds cues which improves deception detection. This idea further was supported because inherently, text transmits fewer cues than audio. We found that regular text and audio were not significantly different in terms of deception detection. This supports the argument that annotating text is a powerful way to add cues and hence to increase detection success.
In general, the data collected for the current study supports earlier findings that more embedded cues enable people more accurately to detect deception, but that other factors related to synchronicity such as conveyance and reprocessability should be considered. A main effect existed, which indicated that embedded cues significantly affect deception detection. Examination of the results in more detail suggested adding cues back into the snippets in lower synchronicity media types led to more accurate detection.
Limitations
Several limitations exist in the design and measurement of this study. First, respondents had little personal stake in deception detection. However, this condition existed across all treatments. Second, generalizability issues may exist. The deception videos and the experimental treatments were developed and administered in the United States using Qualtrics panels and other distribution methods. Current research suggests cultural elements, which were not considered, may McHaney, George, Gupta / Deception Detection -Annotated Text-Based Cues significantly influence deception detection (Marett et al., 2017) . Consequently, the current study would benefit from additional data collection opportunities utilizing varied cultural backgrounds. Other limitations relate to the sample size, which was large and might have inflated significance levels. Likewise, the snippets used in this study may have been subject to Internet speed constraints and other issues since the subjects took the survey using their own computing devices.
Future Research
Potential ideas for expansion of this study include utilizing different forms of social media to determine if various venues lend themselves to easier deception detection in work-related settings. This study only used limited forms of online audio, text, and annotated text for this purpose and could benefit from a mix of social media experimentation. Additional cultural backgrounds, demographic features, social media experience and other factors may impact the results. Further research into use of paralanguage and emoticons in asynchronous communication could result in additional insights into this topic area. Likewise, future research could help determine which types of cues can be embedded as annotated text in effective ways. If this can be done systematically, perhaps deception detection in media with higher levels of synchronicity can be improved.
Conclusion
Synchronicity in asynchronous media appears to affect detection of deceptive messages. The findings of this study suggest embedded cues are only part of a complex mixture of influences that determine whether receivers believe deception is present in communication. For instance, from MST, the concepts of conveyance and rehearsability may be important. Likewise, social presence is an important factor in deception detection. We believe social media and other rich media applications make this issue relevant to managers, decision makers, and those working in business. Asynchronous online interactions may be subject to senders that have strategically selected a channel intended to hide their true intentions. The results suggest that embedded annotated, text-based cues can enhance deception detection. This is helpful to the receiver but, at the same time, it is important to note that asynchronous media can be altered, making detection more difficult.
